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Abstract 
Previous studies have demonstrated that a multitude of options can lead to choice overload, 
reducing decision quality. Through controlled experiments, we examine sequential choice 
architectures that enable the choice set to remain large while potentially reducing the effect of 
choice overload. A specific tournament-style architecture achieves this goal. An alternate 
architecture in which subjects compare each subset of options to the most preferred option 
encountered thus far fails to improve performance due to the status quo bias. Subject preferences 
over different choice architectures are negatively correlated with performance, suggesting that 
providing choice over architectures might reduce the quality of decisions. 
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I. Introduction 
Many decisions involve large choice sets from which one option must be selected. Financial 
retirement planning and health care insurance selection both present individuals with a seemingly 
limitless number of options. For example, Medicare participants can be confronted with over one 
hundred health insurance and prescription drug plans. Even less-consequential decisions often 
involve large choice sets, including shopping for a car, a cell phone plan, or a box of cereal. 
Traditional economic theory holds that more choice is better as the optimum over a proper subset 
can never be larger than the optimum over the original set. While a rational decision maker 
benefits from choice, studies have found that larger choice sets can reduce one’s satisfaction with 
the decision (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), the likelihood of making a decision (Redelmeier and 
Shafir 1995, Iyengar and Lepper 2000, Roswarski and Murray 2006), and the quality and 
optimality of the decision (Payne et al. 1993, Tanius et al. 2009, Schram and Sonnemans 2011, 
Hanoch et al. 2011, and Besedeš et al. 2012). 
Since decisions made from larger choice sets suffer from the above mentioned issues, one 
way of dealing with choice set complexity is simply to reduce its size. However, such an 
approach clearly has many undesirable attributes, chief among which are ethical concerns over 
paternalism and the reduction in some individuals’ ability to obtain their most preferred option. 
Alternatively, one can ask what tools can assist decision makers while maintaining a plethora of 
options. Some have suggested a form of “libertarian paternalism” that nudges toward a decision 
while preserving all options (Sunstein and Thaler 2003), such as presenting additional options 
only if an individual requests them (Iyengar and Jiang 2000). The effectiveness of this approach 
relies on an assumption that people who request the additional options are benefitted by them, 
and those who do not are benefitted by the smaller choice set. We examine experimentally the 
ability of different choice architectures to improve decision making. Additionally, as people are 
likely heterogeneous in their decision-making approaches, we examine individuals’ ability to 
identify their most suitable choice architecture. 
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The choice architectures we consider reduce a large decision problem into a series of 
smaller ones. Such procedures approach a problem sequentially, eliminating a few options at a 
time. Sequential elimination techniques have been recommended for managerial decision making 
(Stroh et al. 2008) and patient counseling (Oostendorp et al. 2011), and are enshrined in the rules 
of parliamentary procedure (Robert et al. 2011). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, their 
ability to stimulate optimal decision-making has not been considered.  
The choice set we consider consists of lotteries structured in such a way that choices can 
be objectively ranked independent of personal idiosyncratic preferences. The benchmark 
simultaneous choice procedure involves picking one option among sixteen possibilities 
considered at once, a large enough number of options that choice overload has been found to be 
problematic (Tanius et al. 2009, Hanoch et al. 2011, Besedeš et al. 2012). Additionally, we 
consider two sequential procedures, with subjects considering subsets of the 16 options over 
several rounds. In the sequential elimination architecture, the decision maker first selects among 
four randomly-provided options. Then, the three options that were not selected are eliminated 
and replaced with three new options alongside the previously-selected one. This procedure 
repeats for a total of five rounds, until all 16 options have been considered. In the sequential 
tournament architecture, the 16 options are randomly divided into four sets of four options each. 
In the first four rounds, the decision maker selects one option from each of the four smaller sets. 
In the final round, the subject selects from among the four previously-selected options. Both 
sequential architectures involve subjects working through five rounds with four options in each 
but differ in whether the previously-selected option is carried into the next round (sequential 
elimination) or into a final round (sequential tournament).  
After subjects make decisions under all three choice architectures, we elicit their 
preferences over the three choice architectures. The computer then randomly eliminates one of 
the three architectures and subjects complete another task in the more preferred of the two 
remaining architectures. This allows us to examine whether subject preferences coincide with the 
architecture that leads each to the best decision. 
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A rational decision maker who evaluates the expected profit from each option and selects 
the optimal one from each choice set should not be affected by the simultaneous or sequential 
nature of the decision-problem. Conversely, a subject susceptible to choice overload may benefit 
from smaller choice sets. Regardless of the benefits of smaller choice sets, the introduction of 
sequential choice also changes decision making (Read and Loewenstein 1995). Sequential 
decisions are subject to inertia, or the status quo bias, by which the most recent selection is likely 
to be maintained (Agnew et al. 2003) in the next decision. While the sequential elimination 
architecture is perhaps more intuitive, its carryover of the selected option into the next decision 
round may exacerbate the status quo bias. The sequential tournament architecture in which 
previously-selected options appear together in the final round may mitigate this effect. 
We identify three main results. First, we find that the sequential tournament generates the 
best overall performance. Second, sequential elimination offers no improvement over 
simultaneous choice due to the presence of significant inertia in subjects’ sequential decisions. 
Third, while the sequential tournament generates the best performance, this choice architecture is 
least preferred by subjects of the three considered. We find evidence of adverse self-sorting, by 
which a portion of subjects select personally-suboptimal choice architectures. This suggests that 
allowing individuals to select their preferred choice architecture need not lead to improvements 
in decision making. 
II. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Subjects participated in a computerized experiment consisting of four decision tasks. Every 
decision task contained sixteen options and twelve potential states of nature. Options were 
characterized by a payment of $25 under some states of nature, and zero otherwise. After each 
decision task, a state of nature was randomly drawn from a known probability distribution. If the 
option that the subject selected contained the drawn state of nature, the subject earned $25 for 
that task. Thus, the optimal option was the option for which the prize was paid with the greatest 
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probability. The key feature of this framework is that it allows for an objective evaluation and 
ranking of options independent of subjects’ risk preferences (Besedeš et al. 2012).  
 While each task involved selecting one of sixteen options, the choice architecture, or 
process that governed the selection, varied. Three different choice architectures were employed. 
First, in the simultaneous choice procedure, subjects selected one option from all sixteen 
displayed at once. Figure 1 presents a sample screenshot of this task. To the subjects, the states 
of nature were presented as cards numbered 1 to 12. The likelihood of a particular state was 
reflected in the frequency with which that card type appeared in a deck of 100 cards and 
presented in the “Odds” column. The sixteen options were labeled A through P and payment for 
certain cards (states) was denoted by a checkmark. In this example, the deck contains three Card 
1s, five Card 2s, 4 Card 3s, and so on. A person who selected Option A would earn $25 for this 
task if a Card 1, Card 3, Card 5, Card 7, Card 8, or Card 11 were randomly drawn and would 
receive zero otherwise. Thus, the likelihood of a Card 1 being drawn is 3 out of 100 and the 
likelihood that Option A results in payment is 3 + 4 + 9 + 4 + 1 2 + 15 = 47 out of 100.   
 
    
 Second, in the sequential elimination architecture, subjects selected one option from 
sixteen possible options through a series of five rounds. In the first round, Options A through D 
were presented and one was selected. The selected option, along with Options E through G, was 
Figure 1: Screenshot of a Sample Simultaneous Choice Procedure 
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presented in round two. The option selected in round 2 was then presented along with Options H 
through J in round three, and so on through rounds four and five until all sixteen options had 
been presented. The final (fifth round) decision was the subject’s selected option for the task.  
Third, in the sequential tournament architecture, subjects also selected one option from 
sixteen possible options through a series of five rounds. In the first round, Options A through D 
were presented and one was selected. In the second round, Options E through H were presented 
and one was selected, and so on. By the end of the fourth round, the subject had seen all 16 
options and selected one from each round. These four previously selected options were then 
presented in the fifth round and the final choice was made. The difference between sequential 
elimination and sequential tournament is that in sequential elimination the option selected in one 
round appears again in the next round, whereas in sequential tournament, a selected option does 
not reappear until the final round.1 
 Subjects were first required to complete a task using each of the three choice 
architectures, the order of which was randomized for each subject. Architecture-specific 
instructions were provided just before completing each task and subjects learned their earnings 
from each task at the end of that task. Prior to the fourth task, subjects provided a ranking of the 
three architectures which were used to select the choice architecture for the fourth task. This was 
incentivized by having the computer randomly eliminate one of the three choice architectures 
and implement the more preferred of the two remaining choice architectures for the fourth task. 
Subjects received instruction that it is in their best interest to reveal their preferences truthfully as 
the procedure yielded a 2/3 chance of using the choice architecture reported as being most 
preferred and no chance of using the one reported as being least preferred. While subjects 
experienced the three choice architectures in a random order over the first three tasks, this 
preference procedure was always last so that subjects could make an informed decision.   
To provide four similar, but not identical, choice tasks, the probability distributions were 
altered slightly across decision tasks. The four choice tasks are described in Table 1. The four 
                                                            
1 In experimental instructions we referred to simultaneous choice as select one, to sequential elimination as keep 
one, and to sequential tournament as send to final. These terms describe what subjects do in each task.  
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probability distributions, PDF1 through PDF4, have similar probabilities for the most and least 
likely outcomes and nearly identical average probabilities across options (between 56.3 and 
56.4). The black areas in Table 1 represent the states covered by each option. No two options are 
identical either in terms of the states contained, or in terms of expected value under any of the 
PDFs. The optimal option resulted in receiving the prize with approximately an 80% chance 
while the worst option yielded the prize with approximately 34% chance. To further ensure that 
the choice tasks appeared significantly different to subjects, the order of PDFs across tasks, and 
of options and states within tasks, were randomized. Thus, the subjects faced four similar 
decision problems, but could not use information about one problem on a subsequent one. 
Notably, subjects had the ability to provide post-experiment feedback, with none noting any 
similarity in the underlying set of options across tasks. 
Table 1: Choice Tasks 
Card     PDF     Options 
      1  2  3  4     A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P 
1  15  13  13  12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2  14  14  14  12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
3  12  11  12  9  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
4  11  8  8  14  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
5  10  12  10  11  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
6  9  7  5  10  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
7  7  6  9  5  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
8  6  7  7  8  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
9  5  9  6  7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
10  4  5  9  6  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
11  4  4  4  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
12     3  4  3  3        1  1     1  1  1  1        1  1  1  1  1  1 
States Covered:  8  8  8  6  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  8  6  6  6  6 
    Expected Payoffs:                             
PDF  1  80  75 72 68 63 61 59 57 55 53 50  48  47  45 36 32
PDF  2  80  73 66 65 63 61 59 57 58 56 51  54  44  42 39 35
PDF  3  79  71 68 64 63 60 61 58 57 54 49  53  46  43 38 36
            PDF  4     78  72 69 66 62 67 55 60 52 57 46  53  43  48 41 34
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Prior to the four tasks of interest, subjects reviewed instructions and completed a four-
option four-state task to familiarize them with the computer interface. After selecting among the 
options in a task, subjects were shown a deck of cards reflecting the appropriate PDF.  A subject 
then had the computer turn the cards face down and shuffle the deck, following which she chose 
one card. If the chosen card reflected a state covered by the selected option, the subject earned 
$25 for the task. For example, if the subject selected option G in Figure 1 and then chose Card 2, 
she would earn $25 for that task. However, if she chose Card 6 instead, the earnings for that task 
would be $0.   
After the experiment was completed, one of the four tasks was randomly selected for 
payment. The subject was paid his or her earnings for that task. In addition, the subjects were 
paid a $5 participation fee.  The average salient earnings were $17.66 exclusive of the $5 
participation payment, while the average amount of time spent in the experiment was 26 minutes, 
of which five and a half minutes were spent on instructions and the rest on actively completing 
all tasks. The experiment was conducted through Vanderbilt University’s eLab, an online lab 
with a pool of more than 70,000 subjects who have expressed a willingness to participate in 
experiments. Consistent with eLab policies, the subjects were mailed a check for their earnings 
in this study immediately after participating. eLab recruits subjects into its pool using links from 
partner sites, online advertisements, referrals from other panelists, and links from online search 
results, among other sources. eLab collects information on age, sex, and educational attainment 
from members of its subject pool, allowing us to capture this demographic information without 
collecting the information directly during the study. Our subject pool was 51% male with an 
average age of 48 years (standard deviation of 16). In terms of educational attainment, 30% of 
the subjects were college graduates, 32% had some college, and 38% had no schooling beyond 
high school.  
   
8 
 
III. Results 
A. Choice Architecture and Quality of Decisions 
We begin with a summary of overall performance on the first three tasks using two different 
measures. The first measure, “Optimal Choice,” is the frequency with which subjects select the 
option that yields the highest likelihood of payment. The second measure reflects how far the 
selected option is from the optimal one. It is equal to the difference between the probability of 
receiving payment under the optimal option and the probability of receiving payment under the 
selected option. We refer to this measure as “Money Left on the Table” since it reflects the 
reduction in the probability of payment from suboptimal choice. Across all tasks, subjects select 
optimally 28% of the time and selected options have an average probability of payment that is 14 
percentage points lower than the optimal option. Thus, with $25 at stake, subjects on average 
earn $3.50 (= $25 × 0.14) less than they would with optimal choices.2  
Results are presented in Table 2. The sequential tournament leads to a significantly 
higher frequency of optimal choice than either simultaneous choice or sequential elimination 
(Wilcoxon p=0.011 and 0.029, respectively), while sequential elimination and simultaneous 
choice are not significantly different (p=0.470). Sequential tournament also leads to less money 
left on the table than simultaneous choice (p=0.047), while sequential elimination is not 
significantly different from simultaneous choice (p=0.864). 
Table 2 ‐ Average Performance across Choice Architectures 
   Optimal Choice   Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice  23%  0.14 
Sequential elimination  25%  0.14 
Sequential tournament  36%  0.12 
 
To control for confounding effects of task and demographic characteristics, we estimate a 
probit regression for optimal choice and an OLS regression for money left on the table. We have 
                                                            
2 The main results are qualitatively unchanged if we use alternative measures of efficiency, such as the ratio of 
payoffs of the chosen and optimal options.  
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a total of 333 observations, 3 for each subject. We include demographic variables for age, sex, 
and dummies for educational attainment (some college and college graduate, with high school 
the omitted variable). We also include PDF and task order fixed effects (suppressed for brevity). 
Treatment dummy variables for the sequential choice architectures are included (with 
simultaneous choice as the omitted variable). 
Table 3 ‐ Factors Influencing Choice Quality 
Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Sequential elimination  0.108  ‐0.443 
(0.128)  (1.368) 
Sequential tournament  0.448***  ‐2.164* 
(0.163)  (1.151) 
Age  ‐0.006  0.061 
(0.006)  (0.049) 
Male dummy  ‐0.087  2.167 
(0.202)  (1.690) 
Some college  0.678***  ‐5.608*** 
(0.240)  (2.059) 
College graduate  0.584**  ‐5.892*** 
(0.253)  (1.890) 
Constant  ‐0.670*  12.141*** 
(0.392)  (3.275) 
Observations  333  333 
log likelihood  ‐184  ‐1280 
Probit coefficients reported for optimal choice, OLS for Money Left on the Table. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. PDF and task order 
fixed effects included, but not reported. Money left on the table was measured on a 0‐100 scale. 
 
 The regression results in Table 3 confirm the relative performance in Table 2. Sequential 
elimination does not lead to significant improvement over simultaneous choice, while the 
sequential tournament architecture significantly improves the quality of choices, both in terms of 
increased frequency of optimal choice and reduced amount of money left on the table. Of the 
demographic variables, age and sex appear to play no role while education beyond high school is 
correlated with an estimated twenty percentage point increase in the chance of selecting the 
optimal option. Averaging across subjects, the sequential tournament architecture leads to a 
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predicted fourteen percentage point increase in optimal choice frequency relative to simultaneous 
choice. Conversely, sequential elimination leads to no significant improvement.       
B. Choice Overload and the Status Quo Bias 
The choice overload hypothesis suggests that smaller choice sets can result in better decisions. In 
our experiment, each round in the sequential elimination and sequential tournament architectures 
involves a choice among only four options whereas the simultaneous decision architecture 
involves a choice among sixteen options. We first examine whether decision making is better in 
4-option choices than in 16-option choices (Table 4). Here, measures of optimal choice and 
money left on the table are relative to the set of options in each round. Thus, for the simultaneous 
decision, these measures coincide with those in Table 3, but do not for the other two 
architectures. We again consider only the first three tasks, and exclude the fourth task in which 
subjects chose the choice architecture. The frequency of optimal choice when selecting among 
16 options at once is only 23%, while the average across all rounds in sequential architectures is 
47%. This is consistent with choice overload.  
Table 4 ‐ Round‐by‐Round Performance 
Task  Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice (16 options)  23%  0.14 
Sequential elimination (4 options)  46%  0.08 
Sequential tournament (4 options)  48%  0.08 
 
 Our results so far indicate decision making is better when fewer options are considered at 
once, but that the way a large set of options is broken into smaller parts matters for the quality of 
the final decision. Given this result, we try to understand why performance in the sequential 
tournament architecture is superior to performance in the sequential elimination architecture 
even though both entail the same number of decisions over choice sets of the same size. We offer 
two possible explanations. 
First, we consider the possibility that subjects simply make independent errors in each 
round. These independent errors, even if equal across architectures, produce different rates of 
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optimal choice among all sixteen options for the two sequential architectures. For a subject to 
select the optimal option in the sequential tournament architecture, she must select optimally in 
two rounds: the round in which the option first appears, and the final round. For the sequential 
elimination architecture, the subject must select optimally in the first round in which the optimal 
option appears, and in each subsequent round. Statistically, this makes the chance of selecting 
the optimal option higher in the sequential tournament architecture than in the sequential 
elimination architecture.3 In our case, the 46% chance of selecting the best option in each round 
of sequential elimination would translate into a 16% of selecting the optimal option overall under 
the assumption of independent errors. For the sequential tournament architecture, the 48% in 
each round translates into a 23% of selecting the optimal option in the final round. The actual 
rates from Table 2 are substantially higher for both architectures, suggesting that simple 
independent error rates cannot fully explain our results.  
Second, we consider the possibility that errors are not independent across rounds due to 
the status quo bias. The selection of an option in one round may cause a subject to overvalue that 
same option in the next round, or view selecting another option as a psychologically costly 
disaffirmation of their previous choice (Kahneman et al. 1991). Sequential elimination may lay a 
trap for subjects susceptible to the status quo bias by carrying a selected option over to the next 
round. An error in selection in one round is likely to persist as the subject continues to select the 
same option in subsequent rounds. Conversely, in the sequential tournament architecture, all 
options presented concurrently are on equal footing: either none has been previously considered 
or, in the final round, all have been selected in a previous round.  
We use McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model to estimate subject choices in each 
round as a function of two predictive variables: (i) the expected payoff, or expected probability 
of payment of each option, which proxies for optimal choice, and (ii) in the sequential 
                                                            
3 Denote by p the probability of selecting the best option in each round. For the sequential tournament architecture, 
this translates into a probability of ultimately selecting the optimal option of p2. For the sequential elimination 
architecture, the probability that the optimal option appears in the first round is 4/16, and it is 3/16 for subsequent 
rounds. Thus, the probability of selecting the optimal option is ଷଵ଺ ݌ሺ1 ൅ ݌ ൅ ݌ଶ ൅ ݌ଷ ൅
ସ
ଷ ݌ସሻ. The sequential 
tournament architecture leads to a higher probability of selecting the optimal option whenever p>1/4.  
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elimination architecture, whether the option was selected in the previous round. Specifically, 
“Expected Payoff” is coded as the probability of payment, between zero and one. The “Selected 
Previous Round” dummy equals one for the options in rounds two through five of the sequential 
elimination architecture that were selected in the previous round, and equals zero for all other 
options. We consider three subsets of data: decisions in each of the sequential architectures 
separately and pooled. Table 5 presents the estimates. 
Table 5 – Status Quo Bias  
Sequential Elimination  Sequential Tournament Pooled Sequential 
Expected Payoff          4.627***          5.324***         4.925*** 
(0.631)  (0.601)  (0.513) 
Selected Previous Round          0.459***          0.550*** 
(0.134)  (0.125) 
Observations (Options)  2,220  2,220  4,440 
Observations (Decisions)  111  111  222 
log likelihood  ‐687    ‐691    ‐1373 
Conditional logit coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses, with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.  
 
The significance of expected payoff indicates that better options are selected with higher 
probability. The significance of selected previous round suggests that subjects exhibit a status 
quo bias in the sequential elimination tasks. Given the within-subject nature of our design, the 
consistency of the payoff heuristic across architectures is not surprising.4 Yet, when the status 
quo bias is provided an opportunity to manifest, subjects change their decision-making approach 
to place additional reliance on the option previously selected. The relative parameter magnitudes 
indicate that the status quo bias is equivalent to approximately 10 (= 4.627/0.459) percentage 
points of the probability of payment. For example, a previously-selected option with a 70% 
chance of payment has a similar probability of being selected as a new option with an 80% 
chance of payment. Thus, status quo bias causes subjects to stick with options they selected, even 
if they are not optimal.  
                                                            
4 We pool across both sequential architectures to show the consistency of the payoff variable. By the nature of the 
conditional logit estimator, separate regressions do not allow direct comparisons of parameters due to their 
confluence with potentially different variances. Confidence that these are similar is gained in column three which 
imposes identical variance on both.  
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C. Preferences for Choice Architecture 
Thus far, our results have focused on how the choice architecture impacts decision quality. We 
now examine which choice architecture subjects prefer, and how those preferences correlate with 
the quality of their decisions. More than a half of our subjects, 59 out of 111, preferred the 
simultaneous choice architecture, while 29 (26%) preferred sequential elimination, and the 
remaining 23 (21%) preferred the sequential tournament. These preferences run opposite to the 
proportion of subjects selecting optimally under each architecture. The joint preference ranking 
of the least preferred choice architecture is almost a mirror image of the most preferred ranking. 
Just over a half of our subjects, 56, revealed sequential tournament as the least preferred 
architecture, followed by 30 (27%) who rated sequential elimination as the least preferred, and 
25 (23%) who rated simultaneous choice as the least preferred architecture. 
Given our procedure for eliciting rankings, subjects had a 2/3 chance of using their most 
preferred architecture for the fourth task and a 1/3 chance of using their second-most preferred 
architecture. Table 6 reports overall performance on the fourth task by choice architecture, and 
includes performance from the first three tasks in parentheses for comparison. Again, 
performance is best under the sequential tournament architecture despite the fact that it is the 
least preferred. Table 6 also reveals a suggestive pattern. While performance in both sequential 
architectures is better the second time it is used (in task 4), performance in the simultaneous 
decision is actually worse the second time it is used than when it was first encountered. This 
suggests an adverse self-sorting in subjects’ preferences for the simultaneous choice architecture.  
Table 6 ‐ Performance on Task 4 (Average Performance on Tasks 1‐3) 
Task  Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice (N=43)  15%  (23%)  0.15  (0.14) 
Sequential elimination (N=33)  27%  (25%)  0.11  (0.14) 
Sequential tournament (N=25)  40%  (36%)   0.08  (0.12) 
 
  To explore the possibility of adverse self-sorting, we investigate the frequency with 
which subjects prefer the choice architectures on which they performed best initially. We focus 
on subjects whose performance under one architecture was strictly better than under the other 
14 
 
two. For this purpose, we say a subject performed unambiguously best in a particular choice 
architecture if the rank of the selected option is higher in that architecture than in the other two.5 
If a subject did equally well under two procedures then no unambiguously best architecture is 
identified. The data are tabulated in Table 7. 
Table 7 – Unambiguously Best Architecture Performance  and Architecture Preferences 
Most preferred architecture 
Unambiguously Best Architecture 
Simultaneous 
choice 
Sequential 
elimination 
Sequential 
tournament 
Simultaneous choice (N=21)  62%  14%  24% 
Sequential elimination (N=22)  36%  50%  14% 
Sequential tournament (N=30)  73%  10%  17% 
None (N=38)  42%  32%  26% 
 
 If subjects’ preferences over choice architecture were associated with how well they 
performed in each, entries should fall along the diagonal in Table 7. Twenty-one subjects did 
best in simultaneous choice, of which 62% identified it as their most preferred architecture. Of 
the 22 subjects who did best in sequential elimination, 50% identified it as their most preferred 
procedure. The most unexpected results are for those who do best in the sequential tournament. 
Of the 30 subjects who did best in sequential tournament, only 17% identified it as their most 
preferred architecture while 73% preferred simultaneous choice. This means that individuals who 
perform best in sequential tournament are more likely to prefer simultaneous choice than those 
who actually performed best in simultaneous choice. The 38 subjects for whom no 
unambiguously best architecture is identified exhibit a similar adverse self-sorting. While a 
plurality of these subjects prefer simultaneous choice, 85% do at least as well under the 
sequential tournament architecture. 
 To understand the source of subjects’ preferences over architectures, we estimate a 
multinomial logit regression. The dependent variable is the preferred architecture. Our 
                                                            
5 We obtain the same qualitative results if we consider only subjects who chose optimally under exactly one 
mechanism or by defining “unambiguously best” based on which architecture yielded the highest expected payoff or 
lowest amount of money left on the table. The challenge with the latter two definitions is that ordinally-equivalent 
choices lead to different payoffs due to slight variations across PDFs by design.  
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independent variables are: expected payoff from the option chosen under each architecture, 
actual earnings under each architecture, total decision time of each sequential architecture 
relative to the simultaneous choice architecture, and demographic variables for age, sex, and 
education. The expected payoff from each option examines whether preferences are correlated 
with performance, while earnings examine whether subjects respond to actual (randomly 
determined) payoffs instead of those that are a priori optimal. The relative time measures 
examine if subjects aim to minimize decision time. On average, subjects spent 120% longer on 
sequential elimination and 90% longer on sequential tournament than on simultaneous choice. 
Results are presented in Table 8. Coefficients are presented as relative risk ratios for preferring 
each sequential architecture relative to simultaneous choice. Thus, coefficients less than one 
imply that the parameter makes preferring the sequential architecture less likely than 
simultaneous choice. 
 We find that the preference for sequential elimination is increasing with performance and 
decreasing with time. Specifically, a subject who takes twice as long on sequential elimination as 
simultaneous choice is 37% less likely to prefer sequential elimination to simultaneous choice as 
a subject who spends equal time on both. However, this extra time is exactly offset if sequential 
elimination leads to the selection of an option that is six percentage points better (in expected 
payoff) than the one selected under simultaneous choice. Additionally, we find that college 
graduates are substantially more likely to prefer simultaneous choice to sequential elimination 
beyond any performance-based or time-based reasons. We find no evidence that architecture 
preference is related to the probabilistic outcome of whether or not one actually earned a 
payment. For the sequential tournament architecture, we find no significant relationships 
between performance, time, and preference. The only significant variable is a curious spillover 
effect between performance in sequential elimination and preference for sequential tournament.  
 Overall, the analysis suggests that subjects quite deliberately consider the simultaneous 
choice and sequential elimination architectures, taking into account both decision time and 
decision performance, and on aggregate selecting the better of these two architectures. 
Unfortunately, by not considering as heavily the sequential tournament architecture, subjects are 
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effectively deciding between two architectures that are both similar in aggregate performance 
and inferior to the least preferred architecture. 
Table 8 – Determinants of Architecture Preferences 
  Elimination  Tournament 
Expected Payoff in …   
     Simultaneous choice    1.012  1.044 
  (0.029)  (0.035) 
     Sequential elimination    1.060**  1.050** 
  (0.031)  (0.024) 
     Sequential tournament    0.941**  0.960 
  (0.025)  (0.027) 
Actual Earnings in …   
     Simultaneous choice    1.018  0.502 
  (0.619)  (0.304) 
     Sequential elimination    0.765  0.706 
  (0.405)  (0.431) 
     Sequential tournament    0.585  0.421 
  (0.350)  (0.269) 
Relative decision time   
     Sequential elimination    0.632**  0.924 
          /  simultaneous elimination    (0.116)  (0.178) 
     Sequential tournament    0.976  0.896 
          /  simultaneous elimination    (0.129)  (0.127) 
Age    1.009  1.019 
  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Male dummy    1.089  1.256 
  (0.655)  (0.742) 
Some college dummy    1.970  2.312 
  (1.338)  (1.549) 
College graduates dummy    0.252*  1.294 
  (0.178)  (0.828) 
Constant    0.934  0.019 
  (2.304)  (0.049) 
Observations    111 
log likelihood    ‐95 
Multinomial logit coefficients reflecting relative probability of architecture preference (relative to simultaneous choice). 
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses, with ** and * denoting significance at 5% and 10% levels. 
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IV. Conclusions 
By now, several studies have suggested that increased choice may not be beneficial to decision 
makers. Despite the greater likelihood of a better option being available, a wider variety of 
choices may lead to choice overload, greater regret, and more indecision. This has led some to 
suggest that choice sets should be restricted (Schwartz 2005). From a practical standpoint, all 
proposals calling for restricting a choice set face the criticism of being paternalistic in 
determining how choices are restricted.   
Instead of attempting to restrict the choice set, we seek to identify a choice architecture 
that will enhance decision quality while maintaining the size of the choice set. Consistent with 
previous work, we find that decision making improves when fewer options are considered 
concurrently. Thus, our focus is on two sequential processes that break a decision into a series of 
choices each among a small number of options. The intuitive and commonly suggested 
sequential elimination approach is actually not beneficial. When a previously-selected option is 
compared to a new subset of options, subjects exhibit a status quo bias which causes them to 
undervalue new options.   
 Our sequential tournament process does succeed in improving the quality of decision 
making.  This choice architecture first places options into subgroups and then the options 
selected from each subgroup are combined into a final set from which the ultimate decision is 
made. It captures the advantage of a small choice set for each decision while avoiding the status 
quo bias.  
 While we find that a sequential tournament improves aggregate decision making, 
individuals prefer to make decisions from all of the options at once. In the aggregate, there is a 
negative correlation between architecture performance and architecture choice. We find evidence 
of adverse self-sorting with subjects preferring choice architectures in which they did not have 
their best performance. Thus, simply letting people select a choice architecture may be 
insufficient to facilitate improved decision making.   
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Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue for “libertarian paternalism,” a decision-making 
intervention in which choice architectures direct towards certain choices while maintaining the 
opportunity to select among the full range of options. For example, Iyengar and Jiang (2000) 
suggest that people should initially be presented with only a few options while retaining the 
ability to consider a larger set of options if they so choose. The desirability of such a choice 
architecture inherently assumes that adverse self-sorting is not a problem and that only the right 
people expand the choice set. Specifically, for such an architecture to improve choice quality, 
preferences over choice set size and performance under different choice set sizes need to 
correspond.  
Our findings essentially push the paternalistic discussion associated with choice overload 
back one level. More, but not all, people would make better decisions with a sequential 
tournament; however, this choice architecture is the least preferred of those we consider.  
Therefore, in some cases, policy makers or others designing a choice problem may wish to 
impose an unpopular procedure in order to improve decision making quality. Clearly, the 
appropriateness of such libertarian paternalism needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.      
 
   
19 
 
References 
Agnew, Julie, Pierluigi Balduzzi, and Sunden Annika (2003), “Portfolio choice and trading in a 
large 401(k) plan,” American Economic Review, 93(1): 193–215. 
 
Besedeš, Tibor, Cary Deck, Sudipta Sarangi, and Mikhael Shor (2012), “Age Effects and 
Heuristics in Decision Making,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2), forthcoming.  
 
Hanoch, Yaniv, Stacey Wood, Andrew Barnes, Pi-Ju Liu, and Thomas Rice (2011), “Choosing 
the right Medicare prescription drug plan: The Effect of Age, Strategy Selection and 
Choice Set Size,” Health Psychology, 30(6): 719–727.  
 
Iyengar, Sheena S., and Mark R. Lepper (2000), “When Choice is Demotivating: Can One 
Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
79(6): 995–1006. 
 
Iyengar, Sheena S., and Wei Jiang (2000), “The Psychological Costs of Ever Increasing Choice: 
A Fallback to the Sure Bet,” Columbia University, mimeo.  
 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler (1991), “Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5(1): 193–206. 
 
McFadden, Daniel (1974), “Conditional Logit Analyses of Qualitative Choice Behavior,” in Paul 
Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers of Econometrics, pp. 105–142. 
 
Oostendorp, Linda J.M., Petronella B. Ottevanger, Winette T.A. van der Graaf, and Peep F.M. 
Stalmeier (2011), “The Benefits of Discussing Adjuvant Therapies One at a Time instead 
of All at Once,” Breast Cancer Research and Treatment, 129(1): 79–87. 
 
Payne, John W., James R. Bettman, and Eric J. Johnson (1993), The Adaptive Decision Maker, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Read, Daniel, and George Loewenstein (1995), “The Diversification Bias: Explaining the 
Discrepancy in Variety Seeking between Combined and Separated Choices,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Applied, 1(1): 34–49. 
 
Redelmeier, Donald A., and Eldar Shafir (1995), “Medical Decision Making in Situations that 
Offer Multiple Alternatives,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 273(4): 302–
305. 
 
Robert, Henry M. III, Daniel H. Honemann, and Thomas J. Balch (2011), Robert’s Rules of 
Order, 11th ed., De Capo Press, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Roswarski, Todd Eric, and Michael D. Murray (2006), “Supervision of Students May Protect 
Academic Physicians from Cognitive Bias: A Study of Decision-Making and Multiple 
Treatment Alternatives in Medicine,” Medical Decision Making, 26(2): 154–161. 
20 
 
 
Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans (2011), “How Individuals Choose Health Insurance: An 
Experimental Analysis,” European Economic Review, 55(6): 799–819. 
 
Schwartz, Barry (2005), The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less, Harper Collins, New York, 
NY. 
 
Stroh, Linda K., Gregory B. Northcraft, and Margaret A. Neele (2008), Organizational 
Behavior: A Management Challenge, 3rd ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, 
NJ. 
 
Sunstein, Cass, and Richard H. Thaler (2003), “Libertarian Paternalism,” American Economic 
Review, 93(2): 175–179. 
 
Tanius, Betty E., Stacey Wood, Yaniv Hanoch, and Thomas Rice (2009), “Aging and Choice: 
Applications to Medicare Part D,” Judgement and Decision Making, 4(1): 92–101. 
 
Thaler, Richard, and Cass Sunstein (2008), Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 
 
 
 
 
  
21 
 
Appendix: Experiment Instructions 
General Instructions 
 
 
   
22 
 
23 
 
 
   
24 
 
 
          
   
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
27 
 
 
